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Abstract. Key establishment protocols form one of the most basic types
of cryptographic protocols and have been studied intensively for over 20
years. The current status of design and analysis methods is reviewed with
particular reference to formal appoaches. Likely future trends and open
issues are also discussed.
1 Introduction
Key establishment is a foundational element for secure communications. It con-
cerns how to set up a new key (a session key) to protect communications during
a subsequent session. In terms of modern cryptography it is a venerable problem
that has been widely studied from almost every conceivable angle. One may ask
how hard it can be to consider all ways of setting up a session key. Yet the
evidence is that this study has not yet been exhaustive. One reason for this is
that new requirements have become evident over time that were not previously
recognised. Another reason is that there is no well-defined method to explore
the space of possible secure protocols. Even until today most systematic or for-
mal techniques allow only protocol analysis and not design of protocols to meet
specific requirements. The purposes of this paper are:
– to explore current techniques to ensure the security of key establishment
protocols, particularly those with some formal basis;
– to consider to what extent these methods can be used to systematically
design new protocols;
– to summarise (and speculate on) prospects for the future of these methods.
In the rest of this introduction some background information is provided on
protocol types and potential security requirements. Section 2 looks at informal
design principles for key establishment. Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to the two
main formal approaches to protocol analysis: the formal methods approach which
comes from the computer security research community, and the computational
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approach which comes from the cryptography research community. Section 5
discusses current trends and prospects for combining the benefits of both these
approaches.
1.1 Key agreement and key transport
A common way of classifying key establishment is to consider protocols which
provide either key agreement or key transport. Key agreement protocols require
input to the session key from both parties in a two-party protocol, or more
generally from more than one party in a multi-party protocol. In a key transport
protocol one party (often a trusted third party) chooses the key and forwards it
to the other parties.
It is often stated that key agreement is preferable to key transport. Reasons
given are that key agreement is ‘fairer’ since no party is able to fix the key value.
However, this property does not correspond to any standard security property
and most models do not in any case take account of malicious insiders. Since
any party is free to give away the session key at will, what may be the benefit
of making the key some fixed value? In addition, it is often suggested that using
pseudo-random input from more than one party serves to increase the random-
ness of the final key. This may or may not be useful depending on how the values
are combined. In particular, suppose that two parties A and B provide values
gx and gy in the classic Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. If the random
number generator of A is very weak then it may be easy for an adversary to
obtain x and hence the shared key gxy, no matter how strong is the random
number generator of B1.
1.2 Adding Requirements
One reason that key establishment continues to be a challenging problem is the
addition of new properties that are desired in certain situations. These include
ways of strengthening the security properties such as the following.
Forward secrecy is the property that compromise of long-term keys should not
compromise session keys that were previously accepted. Forward secrecy is
increasingly regarded as a very desirable property. It seems to be achievable
only through the use of ephemeral public keys, such as in Diffie-Hellman
key exchange. (Although it is not widely recognised, ephemeral keys from
any public key encryption scheme can be used to provide forward secrecy,
including RSA as noted by Wiener [Wie98].)
Resistance to key compromise impersonation is a less widely discussed
property that is related to forward secrecy in that it concerns what may
happen after long-term keys are compromised. It demands that the adversary
who has obtained the long-term key of entity A is unable to masquerade as
other principals to A.
1 This observation was made to me by Carsten Rudolph.
Anonymity of principals was often neglected in the past, but with the preva-
lence of communications on public (including wireless) networks it is more
widely recognised as an issue. For example, the Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
protocol [HC98] explicitly addresses this requirement, although its provision
is not so robust as may have been initially expected [PK00].
Resistance to denial of service is a pressing practical need for protocols,
particularly those run on open networks. This is another property that was
considered in the design of IKE, although there has been much controversy
over the resulting solution [PK00].
As well as the above extra security features that can be relevant to any
security architecture, some protocols have extra fundamental assumptions about
the way that the network is set up and the security infrastructure in place.
Group key establishment protocols have become very popular in the recent
literature in line with the increase in collaborative communications appli-
cations. There are many possible types of architecture. One of the most
challenging is the ad-hoc network where the security infrastructure may be
minimal.
Low-power principals are as prevalent as ever, due to the inexorable minia-
turisation of devices. The most common example has been the mobile tele-
phone, and there are many protocols designed specifically for its use. New
lightweight technologies, such as RFID tags, open up new challenges.
Password-based protocols were first introduced around 15 years ago. These
protocols assume that shared keys have only a small amount of entropy, and
must therefore be robust against off-line guessing attacks in which the ad-
versary attempts to eliminate potential passwords using public information.
Recently such protocols have attracted extensive interest, and standards in
both IEEE [IEE04] and ISO are in preparation.
Identity-based protocols have been around for about 20 years but recent
techniques based on elliptic curve pairings have resulted in an explosion of
interest in this area. These protocols allow users to establish keys without the
use of an on-line server or a public key infrastructure. There is likely to be
continuing interest in this area and to date few key establishment protocols
using the new techniques come with a proof of security.
Notice that most combinations of the above requirements or scenarios are
possible, although some are in conflict with others. For example, protocols pro-
viding forward secrecy are typically more computationally expensive than those
that do not. Therefore protocols designed for low-power principals often sacrifice
forward secrecy for benefits in efficiency.
2 Design Principles
In 1994 Abadi and Needham gathered together the experience of many years
and produced a set of 11 rules of thumb to be used as principles for designers
of cryptographic protocols [AN94]. The following year Anderson and Needham
[AN95] added a set of “robustness principles” aimed specifically at protocols in
the public-key setting.
The Abadi-Needham principles can be viewed as common sense rules that
can be applied in an informal protocol design process. Undoubtedly the informal
design of simple protocols has benefited from wide knowledge of these rules.
However, it is interesting to note that at least two, and arguably four, of the
rules are about clearly defining various aspects of the protocol specification. In
addition two of the seven principles of Anderson-Needham fall into this category.
In other words these informal rules can be regarded as promoting the use of
formality in protocol analysis.
One of the principles of Abadi and Needham can be roughly paraphrased
as ‘sign-before-encrypting’. In other words, when it is required to provide both
authentication and confidentiality to some data, the plaintext should be signed
and the result should then be encrypted. The idea behind this rule is intuitively
clear: a signature of a ciphertext does not imply that the signer ever knew the
plaintext. Indeed, there are several protocol attacks in which a signature on a
ciphertext is removed by the adversary and replaced with a new signature. It
is therefore somewhat surprising to find that many successful protocols, even
those with proofs of security, ignore this rule. Paradoxically, much later analysis
of the security of combining authenticity and encryption [ADR02] indicates that
signing before encryption tends to give security properties no stronger than
applying these operations the other way around.
3 Formal Specifications
Formal methods of specification and analysis, usually supported by software
tools, have been used to analyse key establishment protocols for over 15 years.
The typical analysis model uses a paradigm introduced by Dolev and Yao [DY83]
in which cryptography is treated as a ‘black-box’ operation. This means that the
adversary is able to encrypt and decrypt with any keys that it knows, but without
the necessary keys will be unable to do anything with a ciphertext. Numerous
formalisms and tools have been used over the years. Generally the tools search
the available state space and try to establish whether insecure states can be
reached. Various methods have been used to enhance the searching process.
Meadows [Mea03] provides a detailed introduction to the history and progress
of this research area.
3.1 Successes
There are some well-documented cases of new and unexpected attacks on pro-
tocols that have been found by machine analysis. The most celebrated is Lowe’s
discovery [Low96] of a flaw in the public-key protocol of Needham and Schroeder
[NS78] which was found in 1996, close to 20 years after the protocol’s first pub-
lication. The attack is surprisingly simple and once seen looks very obvious and
not at all something beyond the capacity of a systematic search by hand.
In addition to finding flaws many protocols have been certified as free from
flaws using analysis of formal specifications. Model checkers can be used to check
protocols quickly and in an automated fashion. As one recent example, Basin et
al. [BMV03] report that their ‘on-the-fly model checker’ (OFMC) was able to
check all 36 protocols from the well known Clark–Jacob library [CJ97] in less
than one minute of processing time.
3.2 Failures
A major limitation of models based on Dolev-Yao is that there is no succinct
representation of the security property attained by a protocol that passes the
analysis. What we know is that there is no adversary that can gain the stated
secrets using the operations in the way specified. But that does not mean that
there are not other strategies for the adversary that may be successful. Backes
and Schunter [BS04] describe an example in which a mobile agent security pro-
tocol was formally verified to be secure with an automated theorem prover and
yet it turned out to be vulnerable to a simple attack. Backes and Schunter point
out that the reason for this failure was the omission of a critical action which the
adversary should be allowed. Once the attack is discovered it is easy to include
this action into the adversary’s repertoire. A possible conclusion is that you need
to already know about the potential types of attack in order to find them using
the this type of model. It is perhaps harsh to regard this example as a criticism
of formal methods, since protocols of the type used in this case have not yet
been modelled at all using the computational models described below.
A second, and more obvious, limitation of the Dolev-Yao approach is that
the cryptographic properties are not modelled faithfully. One aspect of this is
that partial information leakage and probabilistic behaviour is typically ignored.
A related, practically significant, issue is that different definitions of confiden-
tiality are not distinguished. In the cryptographic community there are several
different standard definitions of confidentiality including indistinguishability and
non-malleability, and protection against either known plaintext or chosen plain-
text attacks. Generally algorithms with stronger properties are less efficient and
require stronger assumptions, so it is a good principle to use the weakest assump-
tions possible regarding the cryptographic algorithm required. Having found the
attack on Needham-Schroeder protocol mentioned in Section 3.1, Lowe proposed
an improvement which showed no weaknesses using his technique. However, nei-
ther in the original definition, nor in his improved protocol, is there a specifica-
tion of the encryption algorithm to be used in terms of the standard definitions.
It is not hard to see that some form of non-malleability must be provided and
Lowe does point out that the adversary must not be able to alter an encrypted
message. Recently Warinschi [War03] has given a computational proof assuming
that the encryption algorithm has a strong security property.
3.3 Prospects
There is no doubt that research using formal methods for protocol analysis is as
active as it ever has been. The plethora of tools and formalisms that were ap-
plied during the 1990s revealed new insights but it is now widely recognised that
advances are required to ‘go beyond Dolev-Yao’ by incorporating new properties
and exploring new requirements. Meadows [Mea03] provides a comprehensive
review of future trends. Some of the main directions that she mentions are cov-
erage of denial of service, anonymity, and more cryptographic properties. Mead-
ows remarks on the trend to analyse real-world protocols, particularly those in
standards. Backes and Schunter [BS04] provide a “cryptographers’ wish-list” of
Dolev-Yao extensions which overlaps with the issues identified by Meadows.
None of the current tools can really be used as design methods except in the
sense that there are some (relatively) automatic and quick analysis tools that
can be used to provide quick feedback on prototype designs. Meadows [Mea03]
remarks that a possible direction towards using animation to help designers
does not seem to be developing. There has been some work using tools to search
for good protocols in the set of all possible protocols [CJ02]. So far it is not
demonstrated that these can find useful new protocols with specified properties.
4 Provable Security
The cryptographic research community has evolved in the past 10-15 years to
embrace formal foundations based on computational definitions and reductionist
proofs. Acceptance of the approach is now widespread although there remain
controversies [KM04], particularly when the so-called random oracle model is
adopted. Initially the computational definitions concentrated on basic algorithms
such as encryption and signature schemes. Key establishment was first considered
in 1993 and interest has blossomed since the late 1990s.
4.1 Bellare–Rogaway Model
Bellare and Rogaway [BR93] initiated the computational study of key estab-
lishment in 1993. Their first paper covered only a two-party protocol between
two users who already share a long-term key. Two years later [BR95] this was
extended to a three-party protocol including a trusted server in the style of
Needham and Schroeder’s shared key protocol.
In models of this type the adversary runs the protocol in the sense that it
controls which parties send and receive messages. To do this the adversary issues
a Send query. The adversary has the ability to fabricate any messages that it can
compute and use these as messages. In addition the adversary can obtain any
session key that has been accepted by issuing a Reveal query regarding any party
instance. The adversary can also issue a Corrupt query regarding any party and
obtain and modify its long terms keys. These capabilities model the ability of a
protocol adversary to mount replay attacks and insider attacks. The adversary
eventually issues a Test query for a session that has not been opened by a Reveal
or Corrupt query. The adversary’s goal is to reliably distinguish between the
key accepted in the test session and a random key. This is a strong definition
of security but one which corresponds to the prevailing definition of security
for confidentiality in encryption algorithms. The adversary is restricted only in
that it has bounded computational power; specifically it must be a probabilistic
polynomial time algorithm.
Successes By now there have been quite a few protocols proven secure in the
Bellare–Rogaway model, or close variants. These include public key transport
protocols, key agreement protocols, password-based protocols, multi-party key
agreement and identity-based protocols. One may argue that the number of
proven secure protocols is nevertheless quite small in comparison with the range
of key establishment protocols currently known. Proving a protocol in this model
is no small undertaking and most of the relevant papers contain proofs for only
one or two protocols and require several pages of human-generated mathematical
reasoning.
Failures One criticism of the provable security approach in general is inac-
cessibility of the proofs. This leads in turn to a lack of wide scrutiny of the
proofs [KM04]. There have been well-publicised failures in computational proofs
for encryption. Proofs have also been claimed for key establishment protocols
that were subsequently shown to be insecure. A protocol designed for low-power
devices by Jakobsson and Pointcheval was initially published in a pre-proceedings
version which was shown by Wong and Chan to be vulnerable to a simple mas-
querading attack [WC01]. Subsequently the protocol was fixed with a small
change.
Another issue is whether protocols proven secure can be implemented in a way
that they can be practically used. An important part of the security definition
requires the identification of the partner of any principal in a protocol run. This is
because the adversary must be forbidden from obtaining a session key in a trivial
way by revealing the key from a partner who has accepted. In different versions
of the Bellare–Rogaway model partnering has been defined in different ways.
The most recent versions [BPR00] used the natural idea of session identifiers.
This way of defining partners is not only intuitively clear (thus making the
proofs more transparent) but also gives a practical way for entities to identify
which key to use (for example on a particular communications socket). It turns
out that the 1995 protocol proven secure by Bellare and Rogaway [BR95] has
no reasonable way to define session identifiers. This means that although the
protocol is secure it does not seem very useful. Choo et al. [CBHM04b] showed
how a simple change to the protocol allows a natural session identifier to be
defined, which can also be used in the protocol proof.
Prospects Over the ten years and more since Bellare and Rogaway introduced
their model there have been significant extensions. This has usually taken the
form of new capabilities made available to the adversary to fit new requirements.
For example, password-based protocols are accommodated by restricting the
adversary’s ability to use Send queries since each such query may be used to test
a single password. Instead a new Execute query allows the adversary to observe
protocol runs without trying a password guess.
Although the basic model is now firmly established, it seems likely that new
variations will continue to evolve to cater for new requirements. Very recently
Abdalla et al. [AFP04] proposed a variation in the adversary capability which
allows multiple Test queries which consistently respond with the real key or a
random one. Looking back at some of the additional requirements mentioned
in Section 1.2 we can see that there is potential for some new additions to the
model. Forward secrecy is already catered for through use of the Corrupt query,
but key compromise impersonation and anonymity do not yet seem to have
been modelled. These two seem to be quite achievable in this type of model,
but denial of service is an area that seems to fall outside the scope of the usual
computational models.
It is clear that analysis in the Bellare–Rogaway model does not provide an
efficient way to design a new protocol. Varying an existing protocol is very likely
to break an existing proof and there seems no useful way to guess whether a
proof is possible for a new protocol.
4.2 Modular proofs
In 1998, Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk [BCK98] suggested a method for mod-
ular proofs of key establishment protocols. The basic idea is to first prove the
protocol secure in an ideal world where messages are automatically authenti-
cated. This ideal world is called the authenticated links model or simply the AM.
This roughly corresponds to the situation where the adversary is passive, so un-
able to alter or fabricate messages (although the adversary is able to effectively
delete messages). Having proved the protocol secure in the ideal world it can
then be transformed into a protocol in a more realistic model in which the ad-
versary does have the ability to fabricate messages — indeed the capabilities of
the adversary are basically the same as those in the Bellare–Rogaway model.
The initial model of Bellare et al. [BCK98] used a security definition based on
emulation between protocols in the two worlds. Later it was found that this defi-
nition is too strict to be useful and so, in 2001, Canetti and Krawczyk published
a revised model [CK01] with a definition of security based on indistinguishabil-
ity, similar to that of Bellare and Rogaway. Another significant benefit in the
new model is that it is proven that the agreed session key can be used safely to
provide secure channels, a property absent from the Bellare–Rogaway model.
Successes The modular approach uses two types of components: the simplified
protocols in the ideal world (called AM protocols) and the compilers to trans-
form protocols into the real world (called authenticators). One of the significant
benefits of the modular approach is the ability to reuse any AM protocol with
any authenticator. Consequently, when one new component is proven secure, a
whole set of new protocols results whose members are all automatically proven
secure. As the number of components increases the multiplying effect of adding
other components becomes more significant.
The separation of concerns between session key confidentiality and authenti-
cation also allows a much easier way to select components suitable for different
applications. In other words, we may regard the modular approach as a step
towards a design method for provably secure key establishment protocols. The
initial papers of Bellare et al. provided only a couple of examples of authenti-
cators and AM protocols. Subsequently a number of additional examples have
been provided including: a password-based authenticator [HTN+03] an authenti-
cator based on static secrets (including identity-based secrets) [BMP04]; an AM
protocol using ElGamal-type encryption [TBN03]; and an AM protocol mixing
symmetric and asymmetric encryption [TVBN04].
Failures A significant limitation of the modular approach is that it may not
be possible to reach all desirable protocols by decomposing into AM protocols
and authenticators. In particular, despite the existence of password-based au-
thenticator when the server has a public key [HTN+03], password-based pro-
tocols that do not use server-public keys do not seem to allow any useful sep-
arate authenticator. This is not a limitation of the computational approach in
general, since such protocols have been proven secure in the Bellare–Rogaway
model [Mac02,EBP04].
A second limitation concerns the ‘post-processing’ of proven-secure protocols.
In order to derive efficient protocols using the modular approach, it is necessary
to perform some optimisation steps, particularly in the case where the AM proto-
col has more the one message. Currently this process is informal, so any resulting
protocol strictly no longer has a security proof.
Prospects It seems likely that more protocol components can be added to
the library of existing proven secure components. This will lead to a significant
number of additional protocols due to the multiplying effect mentioned above.
Another likely development is the formalisation of the optimisation steps in order
to make the whole process of obtaining an efficient protocol fully formal.
One direction that has not been explored yet in the Canetti and Krawczyk
model is multi-party protocols (with the exception of the three-party case [HBN]).
However, Katz and Yung [KY03] have proven secure a protocol compiler which
works in a very similar way to an authenticator. Their compiler takes a protocol
secure against a passive Bellare–Rogaway adversary (one which does not use
Send queries) into one which is secure against an active adversary. It would be
useful to understand the precise relationship between these related models.
5 Joining Forces
The formal methods approach to protocol analysis and the computational ap-
proach are both strong and active. In a sense their strengths and weaknesses are
complementary. The formal methods approach uses an incomplete model of cryp-
tography and lacks a transparent definition of security, but tool support gives
strong assurance of analysis correctness and allows quick results to be obtained.
The computational approach uses the normal definitions of cryptography, but
the analysis results are slow to obtain and inaccessible to non-experts.
It is a natural goal to develop a complementary approach incorporating the
strengths of both the approaches. One simple way to do this is to perform the
Dolev-Yao style of analysis using the same adversary definition as used in the
computational approach, but limited to deterministic actions. Surprisingly this
has only recently been explored [CBHM04a]. This process allows a hand-proven
computational proof to stand alongside an automatic Dolev-Yao style analysis
with a simplified model of cryptography. Going beyond this, it would be helpful
to specify and explore with tools the proof process used in the computational
approach. This need not take the form of a complete automatic proof checker;
even a modest analysis of a part of the proof could be very beneficial. Reduc-
tionist proofs typically work by plugging a problem instance into an adversary
assumed to have an advantage in breaking the protocol of interest. This requires
a simulation of the protocol in order to let the adversary operate normally. Cor-
rect specification of the simulation seems to be an area vulnerable to errors.
Therefore a formal specification and exploration of this part of the proof could
be a useful way to find errors in proofs.
An alternative direction is to provide cryptographically faithful abstractions
of cryptography and use these to replace the existing black-box version of cryp-
tography. Two large research efforts which provide the potential for this are
Canetti’s model for universal composability [Can01] and the reactive models
of Pfitzmann et al. [PW01]. At present these models are still too new to have
seen wide application. Recently Backes [Bac04] has illustrated the potential of
this approach with a hand analysis of a well-known protocol. Another effort in
this direction was initiated by Abadi and Rogaway [AR02] aimed at providing
a formal notion of encryption that provides a sound replacement for the usual
computational definitions. Lately this has been extended by others to incorpo-
rate active adversaries [MW04]. It will be interesting to see what new insights
will be gained once software tools are incorporated into this line of work.
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